ABSTRACT. This article constructs a test of the logical consistency of neorealism and neoliberalism by applying McPhee's (1963) survival model to international relations theory. McPhee's model demonstrates how some cultural artifacts survive over time, while others are forgotten or eliminated from the cultural canon. Employing Wendt's notion of roles as cultural artifacts in conjunction with McPhee's model allows us to clarify the logical assumptions and implications of neorealism and neoliberalism. I argue that neorealism is best characterized by the logic of a single screening system and neoliberalism by a repetitive screening system. The logical test that follows demonstrates that both theories are internally consistent with respect to the cultures of anarchy they predict. However, the logic of the repetitive screening model demonstrates that neoliberalism is theoretically more capable of dealing with the complexity of interstate relations. I suggest that the distinction between neorealism and neoliberalism is based upon a flawed understanding of the operation of process and structure within the international system. This misunderstanding, when clarified by the survival model and constructivist theory, indicates that the two competing theories are actually variants of a single, underlying model.
Introduction
The contentious exchange between neorealists and neoliberals that dominated mainstream theoretical debate in international relations during the 1980s and early 1990s seems to have been eclipsed by an emerging debate between international relations. At one level, this is a rather uncontroversial statement, as neorealists posit that anarchy perpetually commits states to engage in self-help and survival-maximizing behavior. Neoliberals, on the other hand, suggest that states may view cooperation on key issues as a better way to survive and prosper in anarchy. Controversy ensues when one considers the transformative potential of Wendt's statement, by suggesting that neorealists and neoliberals may both be correct, as certain roles and behaviors dominate the system at different points in time. Wendt (1999) addresses the problem of stasis and transformation of the system in his discussion of the three cultures of anarchy. Each of these cultures, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, is based on the dominance of a particular social role among states-enemy, rival, and friend, respectively. Wendt assumes that anarchy itself has no particular logic, but instead must be given meaning through the types of roles states adopt through their interaction. Wendt assumes that states will learn the dominant role of any international system through roletaking and interaction with other states. At some point, one of the aforementioned roles will come to dominate the system, giving rise to a particular culture of anarchy. Once that culture is in place, state behaviors and identities will seem fairly predictable and regularized, as in a neorealist system of conflict or a neoliberal system of cooperation. However, innovation may give rise to a new role that may diffuse over time and after reaching a tipping point, a new culture may be produced. Wendt argues that neorealism is best understood as a theory of state interaction in a Lockean culture, despite its practitioners' affinity to Hobbesian analogies. Neoliberalism, although Wendt does not mention it specifically, is also probably located as a theory of state interaction in a Lockean culture, though its practitioners may see it moving toward a Kantian culture based on friendship. It is clear that the normative goal of Wendt's work is to make states aware of the malleability of international culture and the possibility of transforming interstate interaction to produce a culture based on the role of friend. Wendt's (1999) theoretical discussion of the cultures of anarchy is intriguing, but the mechanism for the diffusion and survival of the three roles is underspecified. In fact, Wendt almost makes the transformation of culture seem too easy through his assumption that states will automatically adjust their selfconceived role identities to be consistent with the identities conceived by the "other" for them in the role-taking process. The survival model introduced below is a logical expression of Wendt's verbal theory that may help us understand how these roles resist, or give way, to change. But before we examine the dominant roles and cultures of anarchy envisioned by neorealism and neoliberalism, we should examine their basic assumptions. Such an examination reveals that neorealism and a systemic version of neoliberalism are grounded in the same basic assumptions. The major distinction between the two is the result of a shared misunderstanding about structure and process.
Neorealism is predicated upon a few basic assumptions. First, the ordering principle of the international system is anarchic. This means that each state is formally equal to every other state and that no overarching governing authority exists to regulate their interaction. Second, states are the functionally undifferentiated units of the interstate system. This means that states must perform the same essential tasks in the international system in order to survive (minimally) and flourish (maximally). Third, states are distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks (Waltz, 1979) . Since the anarchic ordering of state units is not expected to change, neorealist logic implies that the distribution of capabilities is the only source of change in the international system (Ruggie, 1986) .
The interaction of states in a neorealist system has been described as the billiardball model (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 48) . What happens within states' domestic jurisdictions is of little concern for interstate relations. States bounce off each other, with only the hard surfaces (governments) coming into contact. Those states with greater capabilities push past the others at a greater speed. The realist billiard-ball conception has been around at least since Wolfers (1951) . It is often claimed that some variant of this model has been the dominant theme of international relations scholarship since the time of Thucydides (Gilpin, 1986 ).
Waltz's seminal work recasting realism in a systemic form immediately drew criticism from scholars operating within a variety of different approaches to international relations. The most widely regarded contender to neorealism's status as the dominant approach to international relations theory has come to be known as neoliberal institutionalism, or neoliberalism. 2 Neoliberals, like neorealists, view the structure of the interstate system as anarchic, yet they believe that this constant feature of the system still permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states. Neoliberals are thus more optimistic that enduring cooperation among states is possible.
Related to such cooperation is the esteemed position held by international institutions and regimes in neoliberal thought as opposed to neorealism, which views such institutions as transient and entirely dependent upon state power. 3 Consequently, neoliberalism places emphasis on the absolute gains that can accrue to each state from international cooperation, while neorealists believe that states are concerned primarily with relative gains. Lastly, neoliberals recognize the importance of intentions, interests, and information to state decision-makers, while neorealists continue to focus on capabilities as the prime mover of international interactions.
Although I have given a general impression of neoliberalism above, the main obstacle to any comparison of the two theories is that no single, authoritative version of neoliberalism has yet been created. Neorealism's assumptions were presented fairly clearly by Waltz, yet neoliberalism lacks its own version of Waltz. This has created a number of problems for establishing neoliberalism as a theory in its own right. First, neoliberalism is often defined solely in relation to neorealism, either as its virtual twin or as its opposite. Second, neoliberals themselves have called for a synthesis of their approach with neorealism. Lastly, such a synthesis calls into question the essential nature of both neoliberal and neorealist approaches to world politics that derives from a misunderstanding about the relationship between process and structure. Robert Keohane's corpus of work is about as close a substitute for a neoliberal version of Waltz as is available, so I will begin a closer analysis of neoliberalism with his foundational works. Keohane and Nye (1989) developed an approach to international relations known as complex interdependence. Complex interdependence itself is an ideal type constructed as the opposite of realism. Keohane and Nye (1989: 23-4) list the main assumptions of realism as: states are the dominant, unitary actors in world politics; force is a usable and effective instrument for state policy; and the "high" politics of military security dominates the "low" politics of the economy. In contrast, complex interdependence is characterized by multiple channels of contact among societies; the irrelevance of military force; and the lack of a stable hierarchy of state goals. In the afterword to their book, the authors state that the concept of complex interdependence is "clearly liberal rather than realist" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 254) . 4 They also acknowledge that their analysis is focused on the level of the international system and they lament their inattention to domestic politics (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 256) . Thus, this version of liberalism is constructed as the opposite of neorealism, which the authors also acknowledge in the afterword (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 254) .
In a later iteration of his work, Keohane (1984) argues that his perspective starts with realist insights about power and hegemony, yet incorporates institutionalist theories on cooperation. He acknowledges that states are the crucial actors in world politics, even though other non-state organizations are involved in the search for wealth and power (Keohane, 1984: 25) . Keohane also favors the type of systemic analysis pioneered by Waltz. Keohane (1984: 25) says that any systemic analysis must begin by placing states along the continuum of relative power and wealth-an obvious reference to Waltz's principle of the distribution of capabilities. And, in his discussion of wealth and power, Keohane (1984: 18) also mentions that the pursuit of both are crucial to states that are not "subordinated to a worldwide governmental hierarchy." Since this is one definition of anarchy, Keohane's assumptions place him in agreement with Waltz's neorealism, until he begins to look at the independent effects of international institutions on state behavior. Keohane's (1984) version of neoliberalism thus appears to be a virtual twin to neorealism.
As we have seen, neoliberalism has been presented as virtually identical to neorealism and as its opposite. Neoliberals have a hard time distinguishing their work from neorealists in that neoliberalism seems to have no true independence from neorealism as a theory in its own right. In fact, there have been calls for a synthesis of the two approaches to world politics. Keohane (1993: 271) states that his institutionalist approach borrows from both liberalism and realism. As in After Hegemony (Keohane, 1984) , he claims to start with neorealist assumptions and then add a liberal approach to the way states' interests are formed. In the afterword to Power and Interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1989) , the authors make an even stronger case when they suggest synthesizing neorealism and liberalism. 5 Keohane and Nye (1989: 262) believe that neorealism is appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory and liberalism at the process level. In their argument, structure refers to the neorealist emphasis on the distribution of capabilities and process refers to the pattern of interactions among states (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 260) .
In contrast, Sterling-Folker (1997) makes a strong case that neorealism and neoliberalism can never be synthesized due to their principal disagreement over whether environment or process is the primary determinant of states' interests and behaviors. Neorealism assumes that the environment in which states exist is the primary determinant of their interests and behaviors, and indeed, for all outcomes in world politics. The environment, for neorealists, is created by the effects of anarchy. States adapt to the competitive environment created by anarchy by whatever means is available to ensure their survival. According to SterlingFolker (1997: 5) , neorealism "operationalizes the concept of anarchy as if it were an environmental context."
Neoliberalism assumes that the processes in which states are engaged are the primary determinants for their interests and behaviors, and for outcomes in world politics. According to Sterling-Folker (1997: 6) , "what liberalism means by process is the interaction between humans as they attempt to reach collective agreements, and what they create in order to assist them in reaching those agreements." She further notes that "institutions" are often indistinguishable from "process" in neoliberalism and are "used to denote both the interaction and what is created." Process, rather than the environment, becomes the context for interests and behavior in neoliberalism.
Upon closer examination the clear distinction that Sterling-Folker draws between environment and process in neorealist and neoliberal theory blurs considerably. The analysis of a system, including the international system, requires that scholars analyze the units of the system, their interaction (process), and the underlying structure (environment) that they produce, which will ultimately constrain or enable their future action. According to Jervis (1997: 6): we are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.
A systems approach has strong micro-foundations in unit behavior, but rejects any form of reductionism that claims the system is simply the behaviors of individuals (Jervis, 1997: 16) .
The lesson drawn from systems theory and constructivism should be clear: any theory that posits environment or structure as a constant has ignored the processes by which that environment or structure was created and is constantly recreated. Any theory that posits process as completely determinant of outcomes fails to make explicit the environment or structure that enables such a process. As constructivists have argued, states are seen to create the very environment that constrains their behavior. The processes states engage in, if they could be frozen at any single point in time, with their particular constellation of agents, institutions, and interests, is structure. Anarchy, while appearing as a constant structure determining the environment of world politics, is actually always in process. If anarchy appears to be the structure of world politics, it is because states act as if it is so (Wendt, 1992) .
Anarchy is an environment that is posited by many theories of international relations to be quite precarious, hence subject to multiple processes that could destroy it. Hegemonic stability theory (Keohane, 1980; Gilpin, 1981 ), Modelski's (1978) modern world-system, Wallerstein's modern world-system (1974), and power transition theory (Organski and Kugler, 1980) all posit processes by which states attempt to overturn anarchy, rather than reinforce it. Therefore, we should question any theory, including neorealism, that posits anarchy as purely structural and independent of process.
Similarly, interdependence, which is sometimes given as the shorthand notion of neoliberal process, is just as correctly viewed as an environment. Milner (1991) is explicit in calling interdependence an overlooked structural feature of the international system. Keohane and Nye's (1989) notion of complex interdependence exhibits qualities of both process and environment. Complex interdependence is an environment in which actors may find themselves on a continuum from interdependence to anarchy. It is also a series of processes whereby actors take advantage of multiple channels of contact to interact on a series of issues to form their interests. Putnam's (1988) "two level game" approach offers a way to examine bargaining among state and non-state actors under conditions of interdependence. Not only is the international environment taken to be one of interdependence, but the process of bargaining among actors creates that interdependence.
Thus far, we have established that the defining feature of neorealism is anarchy. Anarchy is portrayed as a purely structural feature. However, as this analysis has demonstrated, anarchy is also a process-state interactions create anarchy. Neoliberalism's defining feature is interdependence portrayed as a process. However, interdependence is also an environment, or structural principle. The key lesson for both theories is that unit-level interaction helps to create structure at the same time that those units are constrained by previous structure-inducing processes (Wendt, , 1992 (Wendt, , 1999 Dessler, 1989) .
Interaction among states within an international system will form the basis of the model presented in this article. This model sheds light primarily on the internal validity of both theories. It also clarifies several important features of neoliberalism: its appreciation of past interactions and the identities and interests they create. The model also demonstrates why neorealism posits anarchy as an unchanging structural feature of the international system and why this assumption is not particularly helpful in the study of world politics.
Logical Consistency as a Criterion for the Evaluation of Theories
In his analysis of the evaluation of theories, Kosso (1992: 30-6 ) establishes a distinction between the internal and external features of a theory. Internal features are those which may be evaluated without direct reference to observations of the world, while external features require these kinds of observations. According to Kosso, the evaluation of a theory's internal features should occur prior to the external features, since the former only requires reference to one's own as well as the community's stock of prior knowledge. If a theory is found lacking in its internal features, then there is little reason to proceed to evaluate the external features with reference to the observable world. Unfortunately, the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism has proceeded without much attention to the internal features of either theory, as both have generally been pitted against each other to explain observed outcomes in the world (that is, external features). Logical consistency is a prime example of an internal feature of a theory, and one that has drawn considerable attention in recent debates over the merits of formal methods. King et al. (1994) stress logical consistency as one of their five rules of constructing causal theories. As they explain, "a theory which is internally inconsistent is not only falsifiable-it is false" (King et al., 1994: 105) . They suggest that while the requirement of logical consistency should be "entirely uncontroversial," it is difficult to achieve in practice. One successful approach to evaluating logical consistency is through the use of formal modeling, as it enables the researcher to reveal the "internal inconsistencies in verbally stated theories." However, they are clear that formal evaluation of internal features of the theory should then proceed to hypothesis testing with empirical evidence. This is the heart of the controversy between formal modelers and their critics.
Stephen Walt (1999: 12-13) , in his scathing critique of formal modeling, provides three criteria for theory evaluation: logical consistency and precision, the degree of originality, and empirical validity. Walt argues that of these three the degree of originality and the empirical validity of a theory are "especially prized."
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Since logical consistency is lauded as one of the primary contributions of formal theory, it should come as no surprise that the remainder of Walt's article denigrates this internal feature, and castigates formal modelers for their lack of originality and empirical testing. Walt's piece prompted a series of replies from researchers who employ formal theory. Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (1999) take particular issue with Walt's criteria for evaluating theories. They strongly argue that logical consistency is the key to evaluating theories, because without it, neither the theory's originality nor its empirical validity can be assessed, an argument reiterated by Niou and Ordeshook (1999: 86) and Zagare (1999: 108) . As Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (1999: 58) state "the resolution of logical inconsistencies through the exploration of the logic of a theory is a central part of the scientific enterprise." Using even stronger language, they conclude their article by arguing that logical consistency is the "gatekeeper for judging theories" (Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, 1999: 72) . According to Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (1999: 59) , an examination of the logic of a theory is useful for several reasons. First, it requires that unstated assumptions in a verbal argument be laid out clearly. Second, by clearly stating the assumptions and scope conditions, formal theory can eliminate contradictory conclusions reached from the same theory. Third, analysis of the logic can demonstrate how seemingly unrelated empirical regularities actually derive from the same theory.
Even nonformalists such as Waltz (1979: 14) make the same argument:
Many testers of theories seem to believe that the major difficulties lie in the devising of tests. Instead, one must insist that the first big difficulty lies in finding or stating theories with enough precision and plausibility to make testing worthwhile. Few theories of international politics define terms and specify the connection of variables with the clarity and logic that would make testing the theories worthwhile.
Waltz continues by criticizing the quantitative work of Singer et al. (1972) for its failure to examine the theories that they model. Waltz suggests that this failure leads to "confused and contradictory" efforts at testing the theories. 6 In keeping with this understanding of the benefits of formalism and logic, the first part of this article has already involved the clarification of the assumptions of both neorealism and neoliberalism in preparation for the modeling enterprise presented here. This logical clarification should then set the stage for future empirical tests of neorealism and neoliberalism.
Some of the confusion in evaluating formal approaches to theory evaluation revolves around the distinction between models and theories (Niou and Ordeshook, 1999: 93) . As Ordeshook (1996: 179) explains, "models are not theories; they are abstract recreations of some specific, real situation or process." As King et al. (1994: 49) explain, models are simplifications or approximations of some aspect of the world, thus they are never true or false, only more or less useful. Waltz (1979: 6-7) concurs by suggesting that "a theory, though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world. 'Reality' will be congruent neither with a theory nor with a model that may represent it." Models negotiate the rough terrain between theories and a complicated reality, often by serving as representations of theories, which are themselves already abstractions from reality. As Powell (1999: 104) suggests, some elements of the modeling enterprise may not employ systematic empirical tests.
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International Political Science Review 25 (2) Some models may actually be useful as plausibility probes to suggest and offer insight, just like many important contributions in the nonformal literature. In fact, as Zagare (1999: 113-4) points out, modeling to examine the internal features of a theory can be seen as one part of a division of labor, in which the external features are tested by others. The model presented in this article concentrates on the logical consistency of neorealism and neoliberalism, and does not conduct an empirical assessment of the theories. According to the influential introduction to model building in sociology by Berger et al. (1962) , the use of formal models could fulfill any one or a combination of three functions: illumination of a theory or theoretical concept; representation of a recurrent process; and explanation of a set of empirical regularities by derivation within a common framework. This article concentrates on illuminating a set of theories through the use of a formal model. 7 The model presented in this article is simple, and something that even Walt (1999: 8) McPhee's (1963) work is a product of the "first wave" of formal theorists who employed relatively simple mathematical models in the service of the aforementioned functions of Berger et al. (1962) . Fararo's (1984 Fararo's ( , 1997 reviews of the origins of formal theorizing in sociology consistently mention McPhee's work for its creativity and enthusiasm. Research concerning mass and elite culture still refers to McPhee's contributions in this area (for example, Gilmore, 1993 ). An adaptation of McPhee's survival model of culture is explored in the next section to offer insights into the logical consistency of neorealism and neoliberalism and generate implications for future tests of the external features of these theories.
The Survival Model
The test of logical consistency I conduct for neorealism and neoliberalism takes place at the systemic level of interaction. It is clear that neorealism is a third image (Waltz, 1959 (Waltz, , 1979 or systemic theory, but neoliberalism is sometimes difficult to classify according to levels of analyses. Any presentation of neoliberal theory tends to be a mixed bag of numerous strands of liberal theory developed during the past three centuries. Zacher and Matthew (1995: 107) suggest that no systemic account of liberal international theory is available. The neoliberal version of Waltz has yet to arrive and spell out the precise assumptions of a unified liberal theory. As a result, liberal international theory is often reductionist in its reliance on domesticlevel variables in its explanation of the international system. As Sterling-Folker (1997: 3) reiterates, "systemic liberalism never appeared to abandon its domestic roots." 8 I argue that the version of neoliberalism I intend to use in this test is a systemic theory. I adopt the virtual twin model of neoliberalism described earlier in this article. By adopting a systemic version of liberalism I am able to test a systemic model of international relations without resorting to the incorporation of domestic-level variables. I am also able to incorporate both the principles of anarchy and interdependence at the systemic level. However, I run the risk of placing neorealism at a greater advantage since it was developed as a purely systemic theory. By confining neoliberalism to the systemic level, I present a more difficult test of neoliberal theory.
As Powell (1994: 327-8) the challenge posed by neoliberalism to neorealism. The first response would be to demonstrate that neoliberalism was not based on the same set of core assumptions as neorealism. The second response would argue that neorealism never claimed that cooperation was incompatible with neorealist core assumptions. This article has argued that neorealism and the virtual twin version of neoliberalism do share the same core assumptions. 9 The article also argues that cooperation is not incompatible with neorealism. Cooperative relationships are introduced in both the neorealist and neoliberal versions of the survival model. However, as the model demonstrates, cooperation is more likely to be retained in the neoliberal version of the model. I must make two initial assumptions about the purpose of research in international relations in order for this test to be valid. First, it is possible and desirable to explain conflict and cooperation with the same theory (Schelling, 1980: 9) . Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 762) have noted that a common assumption in international relations theory is that it is appropriate to study conflict and cooperation as if they were two separate phenomena. I explicitly reject this approach to the study of international relations within the context of this project.
Second, the primary motivation for such research is the search for peace, or at least the search for knowledge and the development of theories that could help to prevent war. Although neoliberalism and neorealism are generally presented as explanatory theories of international politics, they also clearly contain normative foundations. Forde (1995: 155) has persuasively argued that "all twentieth-century American realists" viewed realism as a kind of "technology" for achieving what Gilpin (1981: 226-7) called a "more just and more peaceful world." Gilpin even suggests that neorealism is a "science of peace." Shimko (1992) corroborates this view in his argument that neorealism emerged as an adaptation to American liberal values of progress, science, and reason. By replacing the bleak vision of human nature found in traditional realist thought with an elucidation of the laws governing international political behavior, neorealists provided a more optimistic view that peace and stability could be achieved in the international system. Neoliberals also demonstrate a normative commitment toward the peaceful resolution of conflict. For example, Keohane (1984: 10) states, "I seek to increase our understanding of cooperation, in the belief that increased understanding can help to improve political amity and economic welfare, though not with the naïve supposition that knowledge necessarily increases either amity or welfare." As we have seen, neorealists identify the structure of the system as the primary source of conflict, while neoliberals identify the lack of process as the source, and both offer strategies to mitigate such conflict. Therefore, if the modern, scientific study of international relations has any normative bias it is toward the peaceful resolution of conflict. McPhee's original problematique was also normatively driven, in his case by the pervasiveness of mass culture in the face of diminishing high and folk culture. So, I will apply McPhee's survival model to the problem of war and peace in international relations. In so doing, my primary concern is identifying the type of system that will best screen out conflict and preserve peace. This is perhaps a novel approach to the long-standing "wheat and chaff problem."
McPhee identifies the wheat and chaff problem as the "core" problem in his survival theory. The problem is defined as the need to eliminate chaff that we do not wish to survive the screening process, yet any process designed to eliminate chaff will also lose some wheat. Any process designed to retain wheat will also 168 International Political Science Review 25 (2) retain some chaff. However, the problem is even more complicated than this because even the identification of "wheat" and "chaff" in a cultural argument is difficult. When presented with a mixture of wheat and chaff, reasonable people might disagree on how much "good" material is present and how much we lose in a screening process relative to "bad" material. In this version of the wheat and chaff problem, wheat refers to cooperation and chaff refers to conflict. The problem is how to develop a process that retains the most wheat (cooperation) and screens out the most chaff (conflict) in a system, assuming that cooperation is preferred to conflict by participants in the system. The international system that I create in this model is defined by interactions among states in an anarchic system. I assume that in each period the states in the system must decide whether to initiate a new relationship with each other or renew existing relationships. For example, a new state entering the system, such as East Timor in 2002, must decide whether to initiate relationships with the existing members of the system, and what type of relationships they will be. Existing states must decide whether to initiate or renew relationships of conflict, competition, or cooperation in each period or whether to end such relationships or allow them to lapse (that is, they are eliminated). Future empirical tests of the model would need to specify how to operationalize these concepts more clearly. For example, periodic summit meetings and meetings of lower-level officials on a more regular basis would be indicative of the decision to initiate or renew a relationship, yet the character of that relationship would also need to be assessed. However, for the purposes of a logical test of internal consistency we need not be so precise. Let: A = the proportion of new interstate relationships initiated or renewed in each period which are cooperative B = the proportion of new interstate relationships initiated or renewed in each period which are competitive C = the proportion of new interstate relationships initiated or renewed in each period which are conflictual.
Each of these categories is mutually exclusive. Some dyadic relationships between states are competitive due to the effects of anarchy and the search for power, as per neorealism and neoliberalism-we can think of these as symmetric rival role relationships in Wendt's (1999) terms. However, other dyadic relationships seem to take on a friendly character (a symmetric friend role relationship) and others an antagonistic character (a symmetric enemy role relationship). Even the realist Arnold Wolfers (1949) uses the concepts of amity and enmity to discuss the relationships between states. Alternatively, if the language of "friends" and "foes" is too value laden, think of the relationships as being based upon state interests. Sometimes it is in the interest of the state to cooperate with others and sometimes it is in the interest of the state to engage in conflict. My use of cooperative and conflictual relationships is also similar to Keohane's (1984: 51-5 ) discussion of cooperation and discord. Cooperation occurs when actors successfully attempt to adjust incompatible policies. Discord (or conflictual relationships in my model) occurs when actors do not make an attempt to adjust incompatible policies. Competitive relationships occur when incompatible policies are adjusted by actors, but the outcome does not necessarily produce greater compatibility. Further, let:
A + B + C = 1.0 = "input" = total interstate relationships in each period THIES: Are Two Theories Better than One? 169 a = probability that Class A relationships will survive one elimination, that is, survive into the next period b = probability that Class B relationships will survive one elimination c = probability that Class C relationships will survive one elimination s 1 = total proportion of input that survives one elimination, that is, the average probability of survival.
In this model, there is an assumption of scarcity: A < B < C. This assumption reflects the structural principle of anarchy that suggests that any interaction that takes place among states will tend to be competitive or conflictual. This assumption ensures that fewer cooperative relationships are initiated or renewed in comparison to either competitive or conflictual relationships. The logic that decides survival in the system assumes that a > b > c. The logic of survival is derived from the process of interdependence. The system favors the survival of cooperative relationships at a probability that is greater than for competitive or conflictual relationships. However, the system does not favor cooperative relationships to the exclusion or elimination of the other types of relationships, thus, a ≠ 1 and c ≠ 0. Hence, interdependence implies that conflictual and competitive relationships will survive in this system. Neorealists, in particular, may object to a survival logic that favors cooperation over conflict. The distribution of capabilities in the neorealist system (the only source of structural change) may or may not favor the assumption a > b > c. It is clear that a neoliberal would probably favor this assumption even under the environmental conditions of anarchy. However, as Axelrod's (1984 Axelrod's ( , 1997 work has shown, adopting a policy of reciprocity, or "tit-for-tat," can sustain cooperative behavior into the future even in a strongly competitive environment. The model's assumption about survival is thus consistent with Axelrod's approach. At most, the model's survival assumption should be seen as a test of the robustness of neorealist predictions. Overall, fewer cooperative relationships are initiated or renewed (reflecting an anarchical structure), but the system retains them at a greater rate (reflecting the interdependent process). These assumptions seem to place neorealism and neoliberalism on an even footing for the model's test by incorporating both process and structure in an international system. While some may object to the scarcity assumption that A < B < C and the survival assumption that a > b > c, they are in McPhee's (1963: 32) words, "less assumptions than definitions of what the problem is." The problem is how to ensure that wheat survives and chaff is eliminated through some type of screening mechanism. In our case, the definition of the problem is that fewer cooperative relationships are initiated in each period than competitive or conflictual relationships, but the cooperative relationships survive at a higher rate than the other types. In the language of wheat and chaff, there is always a lesser amount of wheat than chaff in the harvest, but wheat survives the farmer's sifting and screening at a higher rate than the chaff. Neorealists and neoliberals, not unlike different types of farmers, have different theories about the best ways of screening wheat and chaff. If my assumptions that conflict and cooperation can be studied as a continuum and that the normative interest of most scholars of international politics is in attaining peace are untenable, then the problem of international politics is not analogous to the wheat and chaff problem. Thus, if one rejects the scarcity or survival assumptions, then this model is not appropriately applied to theories of international politics. However, I ask the reader to accept these 170 International Political Science Review 25 (2) assumptions to see if the logic of neorealism and neoliberalism is internally consistent, and to see what other implications the model has for these theories.
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McPhee (1963) specifies two types of screening systems: single screening and repetitive screening. The analogy of a single screening system is that of the Broadway of earlier times, when hits and flops were made by the first reviews in the papers (the actual period of time may have been longer, weeks or months, but it is still treated as one testing period). This material was short-lived, enjoyed most of its popularity all at once, and after being consumed by the audience, it was not reconsidered again. In the next cycle, the audience is faced with virtually all new offerings. Even cultural successes in the movies or popular music does not last more than one or two periods. Formally, what happens to one period's input in successive years can be stated as:
The sum of the surviving relationships in the system at any one time is as follows:
I argue that a single screening system approximates the theoretically specified conditions of neorealism. In a sense, this system has a poor memory. Accordingly, it should not matter what the condition of state X's relationship to state Y is in time t as compared to time t-1. Each state is seeking its own interest regardless of previous interaction or the identities of the other states. Recall US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' maxim: the United States has no friends or enemies, only interests. The single screening system is in keeping with the billiard-ball analogy often employed by neorealists as well. Lastly, this type of system resonates with Brooks' (1997) description of the neorealist possibilistic approach to conflict. Neorealists, in particular offensive neorealists, argue that states are always preparing for the possibility of conflict with all other states in the system. Conversely, McPhee (1963) compares the repetitive screening system to the type of screening found in high culture and folk culture. The type of culture found here emphasizes long-lived, traditional material that has stood the test of time. The survivors of each cycle of elimination return to compete in the following time period. Formally, what happens to one period's input in n years is:
The sum of all of the surviving relationships of n different periods approaches a limit:
where n is large. Further, the amount of Class A relationships available in the active "steady state," where losses of A relationships finally balance the input of A relationships, is equal to A/ (1-a) . This statement will have important theoretical consequences for the democratic peace and will be treated later in the article. Analogous reasoning applies to B and C material.
The conditions imposed by neoliberalism are equivalent to a repetitive screening system. It has more of an appreciation for past interaction in that it THIES: Are Two Theories Better than One? 171 believes that enduring cooperation among states is possible. This is part of the liberal legacy from the Enlightenment that emphasizes progress over time (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 109) . States may interact over time to form regimes, or they may simply be engaged in iterative games in which the "shadow of the future" encourages "cooperation under anarchy" (Oye, 1986) . Thus, cooperative relationships should survive at a higher rate over time than conflictual relationships in a neoliberal world. In summary, McPhee's model is an appropriate choice for examining the hypothesis that neorealism and neoliberalism are competing theories. The initial conditions and assumptions in the survival model closely approximate the theoretical basis of both theories. The survival model, then, allows us to examine the logical implications of these verbal theories.
Predictions of the Survival Model
For illustrative purposes, let us assume that we have observed the categories of role relationships and their survival rates. Let: A = .2, B = .3, C = .5, a = .8, b = .7, and c = .3. The hypothetical data attached to the categories of relationships are biased in favor of neorealists, who would predict that most relationships would be conflictual or at best competitive. Those relationships categorized as cooperative would be seen as short-term, self-interested behavior on the part of states. The survival rates are somewhat biased in favor of neoliberals, who would predict that cooperative behavior is likely to be sustained once it is initiated. However, that bias is tempered by the fact that the survival rate also favors the maintenance of competitive relationships. The survival rates of conflict are lower, yet not unreasonable given that neorealist theory would argue against conflict spreading over time within a dyad of states. On the whole, these data do not seem to favor either neorealism or neoliberalism. What outcomes do the models predict based on these data? Let us assume for simplicity's sake that there are a total of 100 new interstate relationships initiated or renewed in each period, or (A + B + C = 100). By assuming a low volume of interaction or process I am providing more favorable conditions for neorealism. The neoliberal assumption is that more process means less conflict and vice versa (Sterling-Folker, 1997: 7) .
First, let us examine the single screening system, which closely approximates conditions in a neorealist international system. Recall Equation (1) The results indicate that almost half of the new relationships initiated or renewed in the first period (48 out of 100) do not survive the first elimination and none survive the second elimination. In the first elimination, 16 of the A relationships survive, 21 of the B relationships survive, and 15 of the C relationships survive. Thus, the majority of the surviving relationships are competitive or conflictual.
The sum of the surviving relationships in the system at any one time is as follows from Equation (2) The sum of the surviving relationships, or the active "culture" of interstate relationships is 1.52 times as large as the periodic input (1.52 × 100 = 152). Of those relationships, the single screen system retains far more of the conflictual (65) and competitive (51) relationships than cooperative (36) relationships. This is exactly as the neorealists would predict-a low volume of interactive processes and a majority of those interactions are conflictual. The results also paint a picture of anarchy. If the process is stopped at any one period under a neorealist system, one finds a majority of states in a position of conflict and competition.
Next, let us demonstrate the logic of the neoliberal repetitive screening system. Recall Equation (3) that demonstrates what happens to one period's input in n years. Let us assume that n = 5 periods: This result demonstrates that the repetitive system is retaining more cooperative (6.6) and competitive (5.0) relationships than conflictual (0.1) relationships. In fact, the first period's input of conflictual relationships is effectively screened out after five periods. Thus, if you freeze the process of interaction in the neoliberal model, the structure-environment looks interdependent.
The sum of all of the surviving relationships of n different periods approaches the limit expressed in Equation (4). For our example:
This means that the active system of relationships is 2.714 times as large as the periodic input of relationships (100 × 2.714 = 271.4). Further, even though A is only 20 percent of the input, it accounts for more than a third of the surviving relationships. Thus, just as neoliberalism predicts, once cooperative behavior is initiated, it is sustained in the system, despite the fact that particular cooperative relationships do not last forever.
Logical Implications of the Survival Model
McPhee (1963) deduces five general principles from his survival model. All formal models employ deduction as a method of reasoning, in which one infers a conclusion from a given set of premises within the bounds of a logical system. The conclusion, including the principles inferred from this model, contain no information that was not already present in the premises. However, these principles highlight the logic of internal consistency at work in both neorealism and neoliberalism. They also allow us to begin to consider implications for the external features of the theory, such as empirical testing and policy relevance. The mathematical proofs of the following principles are omitted from this article, yet the interested reader should refer to McPhee (1963) for more information.
The first principle that McPhee derives from his model, the repetition principle, is that the repetitive system is "better." By better, we mean better at retaining the wheat without retaining too much chaff. The repetitive system accumulates more Class A (cooperative) relationships because it saves them up over many periods, whereas the single system only does so over one or two periods. Further, the repetitive system does not accumulate much more Class C (conflictual) relationships because the repetitive system corrects its errors by repeated testing.
From our example, we can see that in the single screening system, the sum of the surviving relationships at any one time is 1.52 times the periodic input (100), or 152 relationships. Out of those 152 relationships, 36 are Class A and 65 are Class C. In the repetitive screening system, with 271 surviving relationships at any one time, 100 are Class A and 71 are Class C. Thus, while the repetitive system accumulates 64 more Class A relationships, it only accumulates 6 more Class C relationships than the single screening system. Therefore, if the discipline of international relations has a normative bias in favor of retaining cooperation and eliminating as much conflict as possible, then the repetitive system is better.
The second general principle, the vulnerability rule, of McPhee's model is that single screening is vulnerable to letting the chaff in, while repetitive screening is vulnerable to losing the wheat. In our scenario, the single screening system is vulnerable to letting in conflictual relationships (Class C), while the repetitive screening system is vulnerable to losing cooperative relationships (Class A). This can be demonstrated by comparing the chaff error change to the wheat error change in both types of system. In the single screening system, the rate of change and the maximum improvement in the proportion of wheat to chaff in the final outcome is greater from a change in c, or chaff errors. The logic is reversed in the repetitive screening system, in which the rate of change and maximum improvement in the final proportion of wheat to chaff is greater from a change in 1-a, or wheat errors. I will demonstrate this and the following principles at the end of the general discussion of their content.
The third general principle, the discrimination principle, refers to how one should attempt to manipulate the system in order to end up with a greater proportion of wheat to chaff. One could focus on "high discrimination" by attempting to retain cooperation (Class A) as opposed to competition (Class B), or one could focus on "low discrimination" by attempting to reject conflict (Class C) as opposed to competition (Class B). The internal logic of the models indicate that in a single screening system it pays to discriminate low, between B and C. The immediate rate of return is always greater and the maximum return is usually greater from increasing the difference b-c, rather than a-b. In a repetitive system, it pays to discriminate high, between A and B. The immediate rate of return is usually greater and the maximum return is always greater from increasing the difference a-b, rather than b-c.
The fourth rule, the size rule, is that size and "quality" are negatively related in a single screening system and positively related in a repetitive screening system. By quality, we mean that more Class A material (cooperative relationships) is retained, while more Class C material (conflictual relationships) is screened out. Quality is improved in a single screening system by decreasing overall survival rates to produce a surviving culture smaller than is practically feasible. In a single screening system, it is best to clamp down on the survival rates because the optimum size of the surviving culture lies as close as we can get to c = 0. Quality is improved in a repetitive screening system by increasing overall survival rates to produce a surviving culture larger than is practically feasible. In a repetitive screening system, the optimum size of the surviving culture is reached as we approach a = 1, thus the best strategy is to build up survival rates.
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International Political Science Review 25 (2) The fifth rule, the interaction rule, refers to interactions between the "input policy" governing A and C material and the "discrimination policy" affecting the survival rates of that material, a and c, respectively. For example, if better material is allowed to survive over longer periods of time, it may provide incentives to attract even better material that would perhaps survive even longer. The best input and discrimination policies work at cross-purposes in the single screening system, while they are mutually reinforcing in the repetitive screening system. In a single screening system, the best discrimination policy, to decrease c, magnifies the effects from the least effective input policy, reducing C. In a repetitive system, the best discrimination policy, increasing a, magnifies the effects from the most effective input policy, increasing A. As a result, the best input policy is to foster A (cooperative relationships) more than censor C (conflictual relationships) for both the single and repetitive systems.
We can illustrate rules two through five by manipulating a and c from our original example. First, let us reduce c (the survival rate of Class C relationships) to c = .2 in the single screening system and hold the other parameters constant to illustrate the impact of the vulnerability rule. The resulting sum of the surviving relationships at any one time, S = .36 + .51 + .6, shows a decrease in the survival of Class C (conflictual) relationships, while A and B remain the same as in the original example. Changing c does reduce chaff errors. If we reduce c to c = .1, then the surviving Class C relationships are reduced even further to .55.
The best policy in a single screening system, according to the interaction rule, is to increase A while simultaneously decreasing c. Let us assume that A = .25, B = .25, C = .5 and a = .8, b = .7, and c = .1. These estimates are driven by the discrimination principle, which demonstrates that it pays to discriminate low (between B and C) in a single screening system. The sum of the surviving relationships at any one time is S = .45 + .43 + .55 = 1.43. As compared to our original example, this policy does increase Class A (cooperative) relationships and reduce Class C (conflictual) relationships significantly. The sum of the active "culture" of relationships is decreased by this policy, which is exactly what the size rule would predict. Thus, neorealism can accommodate cooperative relationships, particularly when the amount of interactive process in the system is low. Now, let us increase a (the survival rate of Class A relationships) in the repetitive screening system. Let a = .9 and all of the remaining parameters retain the values from the original example. The sum of the active "culture" of relationships at any one time, S, approaches the limit: S → 2 + 1 + .714 = 3.714. We have reduced the wheat errors (1-a) according to the vulnerability rule, thus more cooperative relationships are surviving. We have also discriminated high between A and B according to the discrimination principle. The result is that while A is only 20 percent of the input of new relationships in each period, it constitutes more than half of the active "culture" of relationships at any one time. Further, as the size rule would predict, the optimum size of the culture is reached as a approaches 1, and that culture is large as compared to our original example. Thus, neoliberal predictions of increased cooperation are enhanced when the volume of interactive process is high.
Lastly, let us adopt the best policy for a repetitive screening system according to the interaction rule by increasing A and a. Let us assume that A = .25, B = .25, C = .5, a = .9, b = .7, and c = .3. The sum of the active culture of relationships at any one time, S, approaches the limit: S → 2.5 + .833 + .714 = 4.047. Once again, the size of the overall "culture" has increased, but the amount of Class A relationships that survive has increased at a greater rate, now constituting more than 60 percent of the surviving relationships. Class B relationships have been reduced somewhat, reflecting the discrimination principle, while Class C relationships remain the same, reflecting the repetition principle.
The illustration of McPhee's principles suggests that within a system characterized by either single or repetitive screening there are strategies that states can pursue to retain more cooperative relationships. As we have seen, the best strategy in a neorealist, single screening system is to decrease c while increasing A. For practical purposes, this means a focus on conflict management to mitigate the effects of currently conflictual relationships while increasing cooperative overtures to other states. The worst strategy for the single screening system is to increase a while decreasing C. Instead, the focus of policy should be on trying to mitigate conflictual relationships that already exist as they are disproportionately retained by the system once they are initiated.
In a neoliberal, repetitive screening system, the best policy is to simultaneously increase both a and A. States in this system should maintain the cooperative relationships they have already established and try to initiate new cooperative relationships as well. The worst strategy for neoliberals is to try and decrease both c and C simultaneously. Conflictual relationships are screened out rather quickly in the repetitive system anyway, so states should focus on increasing the numbers and survival of cooperative relationships.
Conclusions and Theoretical Implications
Curiously enough, neorealism is often billed as a theory of state survival. 11 What survives in a neorealist system, if my characterization of that system is correct, is conflict. 12 This is exactly what neorealism would predict-that states will be in constant competition and conflict as a result of the structure of the interstate system. Thus, neorealism is internally valid according to this test of the theory. On the other hand, neoliberalism as I have characterized it as a repetitive screening system, fulfills its predictions of increasing cooperation over time. Neoliberalism is also internally coherent according to this test. Which theory is better? I suggest that a repetitive screening system has the possibility of providing more external validity for two reasons, although a firm judgment on this issue must await empirical tests.
First, states obviously do interact with each other through time. Furthermore, states do not forget their interactions with others from the past either. Recall how so-called "lessons of history" are used by leaders to justify their policies (May, 1973; Jervis, 1976; Khong, 1992) . President Bush, under the influence of Margaret Thatcher, saw Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as another Munich. Saddam Hussein thought the USA would never commit troops to defend Kuwait because of the lesson learned in Vietnam, namely, that the US public would not tolerate high casualties. Obviously, there is something to the idea of system memory, even for practitioners of realism. Second, as we observe the real world of international relations we see that in addition to the everyday competition among states, there are some relationships that seem to be perpetually friendly and others that are in a continuous state of hostility. It is at this point that two other literatures attempting to understand these empirically observed phenomena intersect with the results of this analysis.
Much has been made of the empirical evidence that suggests that democracies 176 International Political Science Review 25 (2) do not wage war on each other. The "democratic peace" is argued to be the closest thing we have in international relations to an empirical law (Russett, 1993: 123) . Neorealism would deny that democratic states are any different from nondemocracies in their international interactions due to the fact that democracies are just as war-prone as non-democracies, even if their disputes tend to be with non-democracies. Neoliberals point to the democratic peace as evidence for their position that cooperation can endure and perhaps even change the nature of international relations. The model presented in this article, though not concerned specifically with democracies, suggests that cooperative relationships can be sustained in a repetitive screening system. One would expect that cooperation among democracies might be higher than among non-democracies or a combination of the two, but that is another empirical question altogether.
13 Thus, this model presents only indirect logical evidence with respect to the democratic peace. However, we should also note that Class A cooperative relationships will reach a steady state in which new inputs of A equal A relationships kicked out of the system. This means that the democratic peace, or any regime based on cooperation, will reach a limit. Thus, policies to foster democracy around the world may add up to naught after a certain critical level. Huntington (1991) has made a very similar argument in his observation that there have been three waves of democratization in the modern world. Each of these waves was followed by a reverse wave in which some of the democracies reverted back to authoritarianism. The first wave of democratization began after the US and French revolutions had given birth to democratic systems, which were consolidated by 1828. The first wave produced 33 democracies and lasted until 1926. The first reverse wave started in 1922 with Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy and ended in 1942 after 22 democracies slipped back into authoritarianism. The second wave endured from 1943-62, bringing the total number of democracies to 52. The second reverse wave eliminated 22 democracies between 1958 and 1975. The third wave of democratization began in 1974, and by the time he published his book had added 35 democracies to a total of 65. Huntington is left to speculate on the possibility of a third reverse wave of democratization. However, if democratic government does produce pacific interactions with other democracies, then it stands to reason that ebbs and flows in the number of democracies will also affect the number of cooperative relationships in the international system at any point in time. Perhaps more provocatively, it may be the case that ebbs and flows of cooperative or peaceful relationships affect the likelihood of the democratization of states around the world (Thompson, 1996) .
The growing literature on enduring rivalry also calls into question the fundamentals of both theoretical approaches. Although this literature is divided into several theoretical camps, each share certain commonalities.
14 First, certain dyads of states become involved in prolonged, hostile relationships. Second, this means that each instance of a militarized dispute can no longer be viewed as a discrete case, but rather must be interpreted within a stream of conflict. Thus, conflict can spread across time as well as space. Lastly, these rivalries are responsible for most of the incidences of militarized disputes in history. Theoretically, rivalries are an anathema to neorealism and problematic for neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism characterized as a repetitive screening model suggests that conflictual relationships will indeed endure through time even though the amount of cooperative relationships also increases. economy deals with exchange, process, and "low" politics. Cross-fertilization of the two areas is often called for in the journals, but through graduate training, institutional hiring practices, and the demands of the publication process, the division is generally reinforced and left uncontested for the next generation of scholars (Caporaso, 1995) .
The result is that academic effort may continue to reinforce a division between neoliberalism and neorealism that is an impediment to progress in understanding the empirical world, despite many scholars' assertions to the contrary. Simply recognizing that process and environment or structure are interactive parts of the same whole could eliminate this debate. This is the essential lesson of constructivist theory. The survival model presented in this article illustrated this point logically. It also demonstrated that despite the unifying logic underlying the two theories, neoliberalism is better equipped to deal with both process and structure through state interaction over time. Scholars and policy-makers would benefit much more from research that focuses on situations in which conflict or cooperation, or both, persist through time, such as with the study of protracted conflicts and the democratic peace. Discovering the logic of survival in these extreme cases may be the key to understanding the full range of interactive behavior in the international system. Notes the types of interactions (role relationships) that states develop. Only if conflict continues to survive should state survival really be an issue. But, as we have seen in the repetitive screening model, conflict rarely survives that long. 13. The model presented in this article is most directly related to the cultural or normative argument underlying the democratic peace. The cultural argument is that democratic political culture encourages peaceful means of internal conflict resolution, which is then extended "across national boundaries toward other democratic states" (Russett, 1993: 31) . Democratic norms could provide the basis for the cooperative relationships presented in the model, and as such are equally subject to the logic of the model. 14. See Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Thompson (2001) for competing theoretical approaches. 15. Ruggie (1986: 152) criticizes Waltz for "exogenizing" unit-level processes from his model, because they are the "ultimate source of systemic change." Milner (1991) also finds that neorealism fails to grasp the importance of the interdependence of units in the system due to its particular assumption of anarchy in international relations. 16. See the exchange between Keohane and Grieco in their chapters in Baldwin (1993) .
